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Abstract. The central role of economic policy in an evolutionary environment is 
stressed. Based on a Schumpeterian view the theoretical foundations of such a 
policy are discussed. This investigation leads to the result that not general rules 
satisfying and maintaining equilibrium are required but a constant watchfulness, 
reaction, and, if possible, anticipation of what happens in the economy. 
Preliminary remarks 
The title of this contribution requires a short explanation. I will not discuss the 
aims of  economic policy which are to a considerable extent beyond scientific 
discussion. I assume that one wants to improve the life of  the poorest, insisting, 
however, that an income redistribution policy alone is not an adequate, and may 
even be a dangerous, means to achieve this goal, that a better life may best be 
achieved through economic development. This in no way claims that a better life 
and economic well-being are the same (although the praise of poverty comes 
mostly from the rich). It only states that the ability to produce efficiently allows 
a wider use of  resources including more leisure or cultural activities. I also believe 
that in normal circumstances there is no conflict between equity and growth. 
The emphasis on development explains the subtitle of the paper: the Schum- 
peterian perspective. Schumpeter's central contribution to economics is his evolu- 
tionary perspective, a contribution which is increasingly seen as the cardinal step 
forward which it was. In this paper I want to concentrate on some implications 
for economic policy which seem to me to follow from the Schumpeterian analysis 
and its further development in recent years. 
Revised and extended version of a lecture given at the Universities of Augsburg and Munich 
in the spring of 1990. I want to thank Professor Karl W. Roskamp, for a critical reading of an 
earlier draft. My special thanks are due to my colleague Carl Simon, Professor of  Mathemat- 
ics and Economics at The University of Michigan, who helped me in an essential way with my 
understanding of what the latest developments in the analysis of dynamic systems are all about. 
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From Schumpeter I have learned that economic theory deals with the analysis 
of  economic institutions, how these institutions work - of  course, under the usual 
simplifying assumptions - and, because Schumpeter is a theorist of evolution, 
how these institutions change out of the logic of their own nature. From Schum- 
peter I have also learned that a theory is not so much right or wrong - given that 
there are no logical mistakes - but more or less useful to deal with reality. 2 Or as 
Alfred Marshall put it, theory is a machine to organize facts. 
From Tinbergen, on the other hand, I have learned that theory and policy are 
mirror images of  each other, with the theorist assuming as given what the policy 
maker wishes to change and vice versa. This simplistic formulation of  brilliant 
ideas must suffice to indicate why the question after the theoretical bases of  
economic policy is not irrelevant. It does make a differences how good the analyt- 
ical understanding of institutions is, whose behavior one want to influence, which 
one may wish to change or even newly create - in Tinbergen's terminology, how 
one sees the instrument variables and the behavioral equat ions)  
Economic policy must, of course, be specific. Historically given facts cannot 
be arbitrarily assumed and this includes a consideration of  how the present is 
rooted in the past. In this paper I can only deal with general observations though 
I will give some specific examples. The first point to be made is that the analytic 
basis for policy should be as broad as possible; one always has to make some 
ceteris paribus assumptions, but one should be careful not to assume the problem 
away. The core of  my argument is perhaps that economic policy has no logical 
place in an equilibrium system of  pure competition, but that it is an essential part 
in an evolutionary system. 
Examples of theoretically based economic policies 
I start with a few economic policy examples. There was, of  course, the liberating 
idea of  laissez-faire which was directed against the stifling effect of  Government-  
created and -privileged monopolies. There is the idea of  a governmentally im- 
posed planned economy which tried to discard the supposedly anarchic market  in 
full ignorance of  how a market really works. With the collapse of  the soi-disant 
socialism, and of  the really anarchic planned economies, one hardly has to say 
anything more about  it. 4 
Since the end of the Second World War we have had essentially three types of  
theoretically based economic policy. The Freiburg school has concentrated pri- 
marily on defining the institutional basis necessary to allow the market  to work 
properly. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the theoretical schema under- 
lying its policy is the Walrasian system. The basic idea is perhaps that a market  
which works properly and in a carefully specified institutional and legal frame- 
work will also have desirable social consequences. Of course, there are differences 
in the treatment of the basic problems by different authors, which cannot be 
further pursued here. 
2 Shionoya (1990a). 
3 This does not exclude that different theoretical bases may for a considerable time come to the 
same policy conclusions. 
4 It is, however, useful to state that Schumpeter's definition of socialism and capitalism does not 
depend on the use or non-use of the price mechanism, and that he never admitted that Russian 
bolshevism had anything to do with socialism. 
The theoretical bases of economic policy 191 
An important  consequence of  this approach is that the State is mainly consid- 
ered to be a disturbing element - which de facto it undoubtedly is - and that it 
is given primarily the function to establish the f ramework within which the 
market  can work as it theoretically should. 
In the more recent past, Keynesianism and monetar ism have fought it out for 
preeminence. Keynesian economic policy concentrates essentially to produce the 
"correct" aggregate demand in the economy - certainly an important  aim. s For  
the monetarists,  the pr imary concern is to avoid inflation and deflation and to 
maintain price stability. This, too, is an important  aim. The aims of the two 
approaches are not dissimilar and their explanations also amount  in many, but 
not all, cases to the same thing, e.g., in the explanation of "demand-pull"  inflation. 
The monetarists are somewhat  agnostic about  what makes an economy grow. It 
suffices that if one lets the amount  of money grow by the same percentage one 
probably  has done everything possible to avoid misfortunes. The Great  Depres- 
sion and later some smaller though still important  declines are traced back to 
faulty monetary  policies. 6 
The impetus of Keynesian policy also came from the Great  Depression, where 
the insufficient aggregate demand had its origin in insufficient investment activity. 
During the Great  Depression there was much talk of secular stagnation, etc. 
which to Schumpeter seemed a total misreading of capitalist reality. Most  recent- 
lyV there was a report that some of the governors of the Federal Reserve System 
advocated a "Wicksellian" policy of equating the "money" and the "natural"  rate 
of interest, assuming the money rate to be measured by the Federal Funds Rate, 
and the "natural"  rate by the yield of Ten Year Treasury Bonds. 
Equilibrium and development 
All the mentioned economic policies are based on non-evolutionary pictures of 
reality. They are either built upon an equilibrium system - whether in the Wal- 
rasian, Austrian or English version is here irrelevant - or on "stat ionary" states 
based upon dynamic systems. 8 
Thus, the Walrasian system makes several important  assumptions, among 
which the most  important  for the present context are that no producer  has any 
influence on price and that all parameters  stay the same or are changed only by 
shocks from outside the system. In this system the State has no place and no 
function. In fact, in none of the equilibrium systems mentioned is there a State, 
The State is felt to be an imperfection, albeit sometimes an inescapable one, as in 
the case of defence or the judicial system. Indeed Schumpeter wrote that Walras 
5 In the foreword to the Hebrew translation of Capitalism Schumpeter explicitly agrees with this 
"Keynesian" aim of the American Full Employment Act of 1945, adding that one may favor a 
particular policy without necessarily sharing the analytic basis which has served as its justifica- 
tion. (This footnote is based on a manuscript found in the Archives of Harvard University.) 
6 Here, too, Schumpeter explicitly agreed: it was what turned a retreat into a rout. But Schum- 
peter nevertheless added that the idea that monetary policy could do very much was ludicrously 
exaggerated. 
7 See, for example The Economist, April 28, 1990. 
s Static and dynamics are here defined strictly by whether i~ere are time-interrelationships or 
not. But in either case the basic parameters of the system remain constant. For the understanding 
of Schumpeter it must be remembered that by his definitions dynamic systems may be stationary 
or static systems evolutionary. 
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had told him that pure theory would never be able to explain more than processes 
of adaptat ion of an economy to changes in parameters  coming from outside the 
system. The optimal  properties of the system moreover  depend on the assumption 
of pure competition. 9 
I emphasize this because on the one hand the Walrasian system makes cer- 
tain assumptions about  the nature of the institutions which it formalizes, while 
on the other hand the Freiburg school and related at tempts investigate how 
institutions have to be shaped to allow the advantages of the market  system to 
develop. 
The lack of understanding in anglo-saxon countries for the publications of the 
Freiburg school is, I believe, explicable mainly by the fact that in America, for 
example, it was taken for granted what in Germany,  with its different experience 
of the Nazis and earlier with its strong socialist parties, had to be said. What  in 
Germany  had an important  historic function was not so relevant in the United 
States. The United States had a Sherman Anti-Trust Act already in the 19th century 
and restraints of trade were under common law prosecuted as criminal offences 
while such practices enjoyed legal protection and enforcement in Germany.  
The Keynesian system is more aggregative. It rests on the assumptions of the 
possibility of an underdevelopment equilibrium and of the drying up of invest- 
ment possibilities, that is, also on specific institutional assumptions whose com- 
mon characteristic is the constancy of the assumed parameters,  a~ Changes in 
parameters  may, of course, come about  as the result of shocks from outside the 
system but essentially the Keynesian system, too, analyses only how the economy 
adapts to shocks to the system. 
When parameters  remain constant, something else happens. Time may be 
introduced formally and thus the system may be "dynamized". This theoretical 
time is reversible, unlike historic time which goes only in one direction and which 
is never reversible. Evolution is not the same as dynamics. 
Evolut ionary theory - Schumpeter 's  Theory o f  Economic Development  - 
knows no equilibrium. It knows a market, but this market  has no particular norma- 
tive properties. It has to do with efficiency and it is in a stationary equilibrium 
so ziemlich ganz von den Verschiedenheiten der einzelnen Kultur-  und Lebens- 
formen unabh~ingig. ~ 
9 When I was a student in Berlin, it was usual to be told that all problems came from "inter- 
ventionism" and that a market without "intervention" would do just fine. Now in fact, most 
government policy most of the time is just awful, so the empirical evidence for the proposition 
that "interventionism" is bad is quite overwhelming. Unfortunately it proves less than it seems, 
because the results reached on the basis of assumptions of pure competition do not automatically 
transfer to less perfect situations. Unfortunately, also, Adam did eat the apple and to wish that 
he had not does not make the results of an analysis based upon the assumption that he did not 
generally applicable. 
lo Actually, it was already argued early in the development of Keynesian theory that the long- 
run consumption function would shift upward. But this is an essentially "Schumpeterian" con- 
cession to the stationary nature of the Keynesian assumptions. 
11 Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, first German edition, 1912, p. 86. Second and later 
German editions, 1925 and later, p. 74. This passage is omitted in the English translation. 
Translation: "pretty much entirely independent of the specific forms of culture and life." It might 
be added that this approach in particular made Schumpeter's views anathema to all those 
economists who insisted that economics was a "Geisteswissensehaft" and not a "Naturwis- 
senschaft". 
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Besides 
Economic  activity m a y  have any motive,  even a spiritual one, but  its meaning  
is always the satisfaction o f  wants. ~2 
It  is only a slight exaggerat ion to say that  an economy  in a s ta t ionary equil ibrium 
runs itself and needs no special motivat ions.  An  evolut ionary  e c o n o m y  needs 
part icular  men and motivat ions.  13 It  does no t  run itself. It needs economic  policy 
which permits, rewards and protects  the right kind o f  irreversible change.14 
The Schumpeterian theory of economic development 
and the so-called chaos theory 
In the present context  the mos t  impor tan t  characterist ic o f  the Schumpeter ian 
theory  o f  economic  development  is that  all parameters  o f  the system change f rom 
inside the system. An  evolut ionary  system knows no equilibrium. I f  an equilib- 
r ium or its ne ighborhood  is reached it is as a reaction against  development ,  not  
because o f  it. 15 
It  is well known  - in fact so well known  that  it has a lmost  become a caricature 
o f  Schumpeter ' s  ideas - that  the ins t rument  o f  Schumpeter ' s  development  is the 
innovat ion  which the entrepreneur  realizes. An  innovat ion  is any change in the 
parameters  o f  the system, any change or  in t roduct ion o f  new equat ions  into the 
system. The entrepreneur  is initially a terminus technicus for  someone who does 
something new, whose mot iva t ion  is more  akin to that  o f  an artist than o f  a mere 
1 6  manager .  
The result o f  the innovat ions  are wave-like movements  in the economy;  I 
deliberately avoid the word  "cycles".  These wave-like movements  are inherent to 
the evolu t ionary  e c o n o m y  and cannot be eliminated without eliminating evolution 
itself, and there are in principle any number  o f  cycles. This is an essential differ- 
ence to mos t  if not  all non-evolu t ionary  business cycle theories. The marke t  and 
the price system remain, o f  course, essential as reasonable methods  o f  adapta t ion ,  
but  they can never explain development.  
12 Theory, 1934, p. 10. 
13 See on these points most recently Shionoya (1990b). 
14 The following quotation is found in the first German edition (Theorie, 1912, p. 124, foot- 
note 1): "In einer statischen Wirtschaft geht die Wirtschaft prinzipiell automatisch und f/ihrerlos 
vor sich. Wo Neues entstehen soil, da kann die Masse der Menschen der Ffihrung im eigenttichen 
Sinn nicht entbehren." 
15 Schumpeter already in 1912 insisted "dab es kein dynamisches Gleichgewicht gibt. Die Ent- 
wicklung ist ihrem innersten Wesen nach eine St6rung des bestehenden Gleichgewichts ohne jede 
Tendenz diesem oder fiberhaupt irgend einem Gleichgewichtszustand wieder zuzustreben. Tritt 
dann wieder ein Gleichgewichtszustand ein, so geschieht das nicht durch die Triebfedern der Ent- 
wicklung selbst, sondern eben durch eine Reaktion gegen dieselbe." (Theorie, 1912, p. 189). 
16 Schumpeter has, of course, written lovingly of the real entrepreneurial type, whom Alfred 
Marshall even compared to a medieval knight on a quest. But in Schumpeter this must be seen 
in his total picture of capitalist reality which includes sociological and historical considerations. 
In his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, for example, Schumpeter points out that the en- 
vironment might become so hostile to entrepreneurial action, that it just ceases to be worthwhile 
to fight against the environment. In the present context, all that is required is that someone (and 
it always must be someone, it can never be a something) carries out innovations. To the extent 
to which this function becomes routinized or bureaucratized, it is a movement away from pure 
capitalism to a transitional economy which makes it ripe for socialism - as Schumpeter defines 
it, not as Mises/Hayek do. 
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How can all this be expressed in a formal theory? Jfirg Niehans stated that it 
was Schumpeter's tragedy that he never succeeded in formulating his theory 
precisely, i.e., mathematically.17 Schumpeter probably would have agreed. But 
since Schumpeter wrote originally, the situation has changed dramatically. There 
have in fact been a number of models of  major parts of  the Schumpeterian system 
- though never of the whole all-encompassing vision - with which Schumpeter 
agreed. 18 And it should be stressed that Schumpeter was delighted about any 
progress of  economics as an exact science even when it might have made his own 
thinking obsolete. ~ 9 
It is, however, hopeless to try to mathematize Schumpeter's ideas with differ- 
ential calculus. Differential calculus is ideal for the modelling of  equilibrium states 
of  catallactics 2o and the processes of  adaptation to small deviations from that 
equilibrium. Much of Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt is a discussion of  this point. 
Before referring briefly to two models which are not based on differential cal- 
culus, i.e., on equilibrating processes of adaptations, two comments need to be 
made which are relevant for the subject matter of economic policy. First, Schum- 
peter insists expressis verbis that the essential wave-like movements would hardly 
be noticed by ordinary people. The really serious economic catastrophes like the 
Great Depression are results of  wrong economic policies and not inherent to the 
capitalist process. 
Secondly, when economists speak of a "regular" cycle of 8 to 11 years, i.e., 
with variations in length of about 33%, they evidently do not mean it literally - 
although Schumpeter has been accused of  not explaining why there was this great 
"regularity". 
Schumpeter was, of  course, quite aware of  what has since become known as 
the chaotic or turbulent nature of  reality and tried to come to grips with it by 
means of his three-cycle scheme. We have now direct evidence that this is the case: 
In an 8-page letter to Wesley Mitchell, Schumpeter explains that: 
on principle I admit an infinite number of fluctuations in the material which are 
due to a great variety of causes of  a very different nature and which all interfere 
with each other in the most complicated ways. What  is called my theory of  
17 Niehans (1981). 
18 This is explicitly true about Frisch's famous model about which a few words will be said 
further on. 
19 Compare the following letter from Schumpeter to Talljin Koopmans, dated May 26, 1941. 
"I am so great an admirer of Professor Tinbergen's work and I hope so much from the line of 
advance he has opened up that I am truly grieved to find that as yet I cannot get over certain 
objections on general logical grounds. I have a feeling that these objections are really antiquated 
and that the success of Tinbergen's work should require us to reconstruct our statistical theory 
rather than to condemn him on the basis of it, You will therefore understand how grateful I am 
for any attempt which competently espouses his cause as yours does." Letter in the Schumpeter 
papers in the Harvard University Archives, quoted by permission. This letter should also lay to 
rest any ideas that Schumpeter's review of Keynes' General Theory had anything to do with 
jealousy of Keynes' success. Jealousy was not in Schumpeter's emotional make-up. 
20 This term is used by Schumpeter in 1908, who gives Bishop Whately credit for it. It has since 
been revived by Mises in 1949 (Human Action). Strangely enough, the word is not found in the 
Oxford English Dictionary, or in any American dictionaries I have consulted or in Langen- 
scheidt's Enzyklopgidisches Lexikon. There is, however, an entry under this word in The New 
Palgrave. The term was coined by Bishop Whately (see also The New Palgrave) who wished to 
rescue economics from the accusation of being materialistic. The word means the science of 
exchange, thus starting a path towards the subjective theory of value. 
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fluctuations is really simple to the point of  triteness: for it recognizes the action 
on the economic system of  a very great number  of  factors external to it which 
are either small or independent in the probabili ty sense, and the presence of  a 
process of  change internal to the system which also produces fluctuations of  a 
great variety of  periods and amplitudes . . . .  I strongly feel that we must  get 
thoroughly rid of  the prejudice that our phenomena are simple and can be 
directly handled by simple methods either theoretical or statistical . . . .  But I 
must repeat again, lest misunderstanding should arise, that I file no theoretical 
claims for the three cycle scheme. It is primarily a descriptive device which I 
have found useful. All I claim is, first, that historical analysis readily assigns 
meaning in terms of  definite economic reasons to each of  those three cycles and 
that theoretically there is no reason whatsoever to expect in our material any 
simple cyclical movement ,  but every reason to expect a multiplicity of  them. 2~ 
But the central point is really that only recently has the beginning of  a mathemat-  
ical analysis been made which promises to allow an analysis of  evolutionary pro- 
cesses, al though the ideas go back about  a hundred years to Henri  Poincar6. 
The systems of non-linear equations which are now being developed with 
increasing thoroughness have characteristics which reflect what Schumpeter saw 
as the characteristic of  capitalist reality: an unending change coming from inside 
the system influenced also by outside events, a change which never repeats itself 
exactly and which cannot be precisely predicted. 
In this view the precise future is in principle not foreseeable. It  is nevertheless 
structured and in a way determined, but not in a unique way. One might say that 
there is a deterministic chaos. This is just a paradoxical way of  saying that what 
appears  as chaos to the untutored mind has nevertheless some structure to it. 
Non-linearities permit in principle multiple solutions, i.e., multiple possibilities of  
real developments. 
To see this, it is enough to remember  that already quadratic equations have 
two solutions - if they have a solution at all - and that the chosen solution 
depends on assumptions outside the system. The mathematician and logician 
G6del has also shown that for certain systems there are always questions which 
cannot be answered from inside the system. And equations of  fifth and higher 
degrees have no general solutions at all which can be expressed in a specific 
formula. 22 
The following aspects of  "chaot ic"  mathematics  seem to be of  interest for the 
modelling of  Schumpeter 's  theory: 
I. The exact numerical assumptions are important .  To give a complete description 
of  a trajectory, one must, strictly speaking, specify the initial conditions to an 
infinite number  of  decimal places. Schumpeter always insisted that theory had 
21 Letter to Wesley C. Mitchell, dated May 6, 1937. The letter was written in response to 
Mitchell's request for Schumpeter's cyclical datings. Schumpeter, however, also wanted criti- 
cism. "In order to enable you to form a judgement and to make it possible for me to benefit fully 
from it, it is necessary to explain at some length the way in which the question puts itself to me 
and the purpose which guided me." The letter is found in the Schumpeter papers in the Harvard 
University Archive, and quoted by permission. 
22 This contrasts very much with our usual approach to count equations and unknowns and be 
happy when they match. Schumpeter wanted to write a book on logic. This like many other 
projects of his fertile mind was never even started. I want to thank in this place my colleague 
Professor Carl Simon for making sure that my mathematical notions are defensible. 
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to be not merely quantitative but numerical. It was also this aspect of Tinber- 
gen's work which Schumpeter found extremely significant. 
2. There are no exact periodicities. This means that the system never repeats 
exactly, that there is no equilibrium, and that theory deals with historic time 
which is not reversible. 
3. The fact that the system has multiple equilibria and extreme sensitivity to initial 
conditions means not only that one can speak paradoxically of a deterministic 
chaos, but that there is room, and indeed a need, for human activities (which 
is a characteristic stressed by Schumpeter for evolution as distinct from the 
"automat ic"  equilibrium processes). 
4. Although the system has no stable equilibria and although it never repeats 
exactly (if it did evolution would stop) and although it is very sensitive to initial 
conditions, it nevertheless has a certain stability which shows in the so-called 
"strange attractors" around which the system develops. 
5. Instead of  cycles there are oscillations which are "self-similar" but never iden- 
tical and which may have different lengths and amplitudes. That  is, they have 
all the properties which Schumpeter tried to analyze by means of his three-cycle 
scheme. 
In a "chaotic" system with its feedbacks and irreversibilities, the feedbacks may 
set the system on a development path which is known not to be optimal but which 
nevertheless can not be undone. Examples are the video-recorder or the type- 
writer keyboard which would be just too costly to replace. 23 
All this is presumably suitable to deal with Schumpeter's analysis of  economic 
development. Of course, only an actual application can show whether and to what 
extent, these ideas are applicable to economic data as shown in historic reality, 
whether reality is indeed chaotic, z4 
These mathematical developments have unexpected consequences of  which I 
can name only a few. The first is that small differences or changes in the starting 
situation may have eventual big effects. The meteoroligsts who apparently were 
the first to notice this phenomenon, refer to it picturesquely as the butterfly effect; 
and the more careful of them believe it therefore impossible to make weather 
forecasts more than five days in the future. 
It follows that one cannot automatically assume that small deviations from an 
assumed norm will somehow average out ~ la Gauss. They may; but then again 
they may not. They may lead to serious irregular oscillations with unknown lags. 
The classical equilibrium approach, on the other hand, implies that small changes 
in the starting situation will not have serious consequences. 
Schumpeter's evolutionary approach tries to show that reality is "turbulent".  
The question about how innovations can have important  consequences even 
though they are small compared with the size of the American or German econ- 
23 See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur (1990). Another example of a non-optimal development is the 
different railway gauges in Western Europe, Spain and Russia, which would be just too expensive 
to standardize. 
24 This important point is explicitly raised in the survey article by W. J. Baumol and Jess Ben- 
habib (1989). See specifically the last section on "Empirical Evidence on the Presence of Chaos", 
pp. 100 ft. There is evidence that reality is "chaotic". Newspaper reports say that ecologists now 
believe that nature left to itself will not necessarily reach an equilibrium where, for example, 
predators and prey nicely balance. (Stevens, 1990). 
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omy has here an answer: small changes can have big effects. Schumpeter claimed 
for innovations only an "igniting" function. 
Here lies also the possibility to model business cycles. 25 The first (and non- 
chaotic) models of  this kind - Ragnar  Frisch's or Paul A. Samuelson's  - are based 
on simple assumptions with but few equations and only a few intertemporal  
relationships. 16 Neither Frisch nor Samuelson make specific empirical assump- 
tions and, of  course, Samuelson does not present the interaction-model as a 
business cycle theory. But both show the dependence of  the possible different 
realities on the specific size of  the parameters.  Samuelson's  model in particular 
shows graphically how the same general theory produces entirely different conse- 
quences depending on the specific numerical assumptions. 
Like Schumpeter,  Frisch postulates that possible innovations exist all the 
time. There is always something happening in the "turbulent" economy. Slutzky 27 
has shown that under certain assumptions random changes will cumulate to 
cyclical phenomena.  Schumpeter 's  innovations may cumulate also in this fashion. 
Frisch explains the situation slightly differently, apparently at the prodding of  
Schumpeter and to the latter 's satisfaction. 28 The point is really that the possi- 
bility of  potential innovations becoming actual innovations increases in what 
Schumpeter called the neighborhood of  equilibrium and decreases the further the 
system moves away from an (not the) equilibrium. The equilibria themselves are 
always different, never repeat themselves and the oscillations may  have different 
length and amplitudes. Instead of  such concepts as equilibrium or steady state 
there are now concepts like "strange at t ractors"  29 and instead of  regularity we 
have now "self-similarity". And quite possibly instead of  the traditional decom- 
position of  time series we now come to terms with the non-linearities of  a high 
degree of  economic reality in a new manner.  
"Chaos" and economic prognoses 
How can we look at economic prognoses as a basis for successful economic 
policy? I start with a quotation. 
On the one hand [Poincar6] shows us models which are exact but incapable of  
prediction, and, on the other hand, models which predict the impossible with 
certainty. In this way he paves the way for a new type of  model, which will 
25 j. M. Grandmont (1985). I owe this reference to Professor Carl Simon. 
z6 There is no space to discuss Tinbergen's seminal work in this context, or its subsequent 
developments. See Ragnar Frisch (1933), Paul A. Samuelson (1966). 
27 The Slutzky reference is found in Frisch, op. eit. 
2s Frisch states that Schumpeter agreed that he, Frisch, had modelled Schumpeter's theory 
fairly. Frisch gave a mechanical analogy. He said that it was easy to formulate the approach 
mathematically, but he did not do so (more's the pity, for no one else seems to have so far to 
have done so). As stated in my brief account of Frisch's model given at the founding meeting 
of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society in Augsburg (Stolper, ! 988), the model could 
not account for an upward trend. However, this might be easily remedied. Suppose the pendu- 
lum hangs from a structure on a raft swimming in a basin. The water released by Frisch's gadget 
which triggers the swings of the pendulum flows into the basin so that the pendulum swings at 
ever higher levels. Professor Simon suggested that the ripples of the water themselves might 
suffice to generate further swings. 
29 Professor Carl Simon has suggested the following further references: Brock (1986); Brock and 
Sayers (unpublished manuscript). 
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indicate what possibilities the future holds in store without predicting which 
one will be chosen. Such qualitative models are as different from quantitative 
ones as drawing is from a computation. (Ekeland, 1988, p. 40). 
Mankind has always wanted to divine the future, whether by viewing the innards 
of animals and flights of birds, or by means of computer models. But there is a 
difference: men can act and thus influence the course of events - to a certain 
extent, of course, a~ Thus the discussion of "rational expectations" suggests, for 
example, that fiscal policy cannot be successful if the economic subjects interpret 
it correctly and adapt to it. But this makes the rather strong institutional assump- 
tions (a) that everybody has the same idea of rationality (a criticism made by 
Gottfried Haberler) and (b) that he is in fact able to act on his knowledge. 
To show what is the issue here I should like to describe briefly the Michigan 
model. It was born in 1953 with about 20 equations. It is the original Klein-Gold- 
berger model which led to the Nobel prize for Lawrence Klein. All large-scale 
models are descendents of this model. The model has now grown to more than 
220 equations which are continuously modified; and new equations are intro- 
duced as the economy changes, new ideas arise, new data become available, or a 
new understanding is achieved. All this becomes possible because of the computer. 
The "solution" of this large system, i.e., its success in making correct predic- 
tions, does not depend only on the quality of the equations and the "hardness" 
of the data fed into it, but also on the skill and intelligence of the predictor. A 
"purely scientific" prediction - or so people like myself have been educated to be- 
lieve - would be that one makes the best possible assumptions, i.e,, here that one 
determines the starting point as correctly as possible, and then just lets the com- 
puter find the answer(s) without trying to influence further the results of the 
calculations which the computer makes. 
But this is just what does not happen and it cannot happen. Non-linear 
equations of high degree may have multiple solutions. This means that there must 
all the time be decisions concerning the algorithm one wants the computer to 
follow. With more than 200 equations with their feedbacks and intertemporal 
connections the degree of non-linearity is no longer obvious, and in addition new 
information becomes continuously available, e.g., new information about GNP, 
prices, consumption and investments, employment, quantitiy of money (however 
defined) or expected fiscal policies which it would be foolish to ignore. The new 
information including the estimates of some future (short-term) development are 
constantly fed into the computer. 
All this influences what the computer predicts. It is obvious that this leaves the 
door wide open for all kinds of charlatans. But it is just as obvious that one cannot 
do without such activities, to use a neutral word, in a complicated world with 
innumerable lags, feedbacks, non-linearities of uncertain degree, and in principle 
unpredictable future developments. 
30 A beautiful example of how the course of events may be influenced at one time but later 
becomes impossible to influence, is Knut Borchardt's discussion of "Zwangslagen" in the 
German economy. Decisions which in 1927 were possible and would have prevented much 
misery later, became in 1931 and 1932 all but impossible. The cost of the Reagan economic 
policy also become only gradually visible, e.g., in the budget stalemate of 1990, or the Savings 
and Loan debacle. This is a different view from the inevitability of fate of the Greek tragedy: 
The tragic hero, by trying to avoid his fate brings it about. Oedipus kills his father and marries 
his mother in the end. 
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Development and economic policy 
I now come at last to the role of  economic policy in an evolutionary economy. The 
first point is negative. There is little sense in developing detailed perspective plans 
as soviet planning theory demanded. The Michigan model - which is a forecast- 
ing, not a planning model - is revised at least every two months,  as new and 
revised data become available or new problems arise. 
Of  course, we cannot avoid being concerned with the more distant future. 
From a developmental  standpoint  the fact that the future cannot  be foreseen with 
sufficient precision to make specific plans implies that the major  aim of  policy 
must be essentially an "environmental"  policy which allows a stream of  innova- 
tions. 31 This in turn means increases in productivity, which in turn means an 
increasing availability of  resources for all purposes. The achievement of  this aim 
requires the creation of  sufficient reserves to deal with any sudden demands 
whether they be opportunities arising or dangers to be combatted.  32 
With international integration, such reserves include, of  course, sufficient 
foreign exchange, but primarily a policy that does not put too much strain on the 
balance of  payments;  and domestically a careful policy that allows resources to 
be made available for productive investments at a later date. This includes also 
the need to be prepared for counter-cyclical policy. This again requires a careful 
supervision of  how money is spent - Florida land booms or Saving and Loan 
crises are not inherent in capitalist development but caused by failures of  econom- 
ic policies. 
In other words, one cannot  reasonably assume that everything will go just 
fine, whether this is in the form of  " t ight"  planning in LDCs or unrealistic budget 
forecasts in the United States. The lack of  sufficient reserves makes it almost 
impossible in the United States to make a counter-cyclical policy - surely tax 
increases and public expenditures cuts are not called for in a recession, yet have 
become inevitable because of  past policies. And a policy which has produced high 
savings rates allows the Federal Republic of  Germany  to deal - not without pain 
to be sure with the enormous demands on resources which re-unification pre- 
sents. 
The issue is not deficit financing or counter-cyclical tax and expenditure 
policies but, in Schumpeter 's  words, the conflict between the present and the 
future, between adequate savings and higher present standards of  living. 
Economic policy must,  of  course, always be more specific than can be dealt 
with here. I start with budgetary and monetary  policy. In the next section I will 
comment  on the need for social policy. 
To start with, economics deals with more-or-less, not with either-or problems. 
The usefulness of  general rules is limited. The question is not merely whether you 
want regulation or not, but always how much or how long and precisely in what 
form. Similarly, a rational price system is absolutely essential, but taken for itself 
it will not produce the stability so often ascribed to it. I can do not better than to 
3~ This is consistent with the views of the Freiburg school. 
32 In another context I have characterized this general aim as ensuring that in the course of time 
ever better decisions can be made. You know that in five years - five year plans have been a 
favorite sport - you will have to make new decisions under circumstances which cannot be 
foreseen. Present decisions must not be such that it becomes doubtful whether five years hence 
sufficient resources will be available for the execution of further plans. See Stolper (1966). 
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quote Schumpeter to make clear that I do not refer to the possibility of an under- 
employment equilibrium: 
(2) The proof that competitive equilibrium is stable, does not admit of exten- 
sion to the case of limited competition. And all deviations from an unrealizable 
ideal state of competition may be so many causes of instability and disturbance. 
(3) Even a perfectly competitive state of things would be exceedingly sensitive 
to disturbances from outside. Such disturbances which obviously are plentiful 
at present [i.e. during the Great Depression] must primarily be looked to, if we 
are to understand the instabilities and troubles of the day. Among them we 
must not forget to glance at the general humor of the social environment which, 
quite apart from specific measures resulting from it, may injure the efficiency 
of the capitalist machinery in a thousand ways by a general hostility to the 
forms of life and methods of business with which capitalist society works.  33 
In order to deal with these problems effectively, there must be a productive econ- 
omy. Only an economy which can produce can deal with all the other desirable 
aims. For that purpose high savings and investment rates are needed; how high 
at any one moment depends on the real rate of interest, which itself is an evo- 
lutionary phenomenon. The first objective of economic policy must be to safe- 
guard the resources needed for development. 
Monetary and fiscal policy are interrelated and in part substitutes for each 
other. From an evolutionary standpoint they have distinct roles. The major role 
of monetary policy must be to allow resources to be channeled into developmen- 
tal channels at as low interest rates as possible. The major function of fiscal policy 
is not only so much to provide a balance wheel to control total expenditures in 
the economy on an aggregative level, but to produce a tax structure which favors 
savings and growth and prevents crowding out. 
The extent of the desirable budget deficit is given by the question whether 
there is crowding out or not, i.e., by the real rate of interest. Personally, I would 
defend as structure of taxes which relied much more on general sales taxes- which 
can be made very social by exempting food and medicines - and on personal 
income taxes, but reduces corporation income taxes which I do not consider good 
taxes from the developmental standpoint. I add that this is precisely what Schum- 
peter proposed. In numerous letters he reaffirmed his strong belief in the virtues 
of sales taxes and simultaneously considered any sizeable cuts in expenditures an 
illusion which hurt most the very people who advocated them most. 
It should also be added that Schumpeter strongly agreed with the aims of the 
Full Employment Bill. This is what he had to say on this issue in the Foreword 
to the Hebrew translation of Capitalism. 34 
In order to appreciate this plan and to approve it - as I personally do - it is not 
necessary to accept the economic theory behind it. The sponsors of the bill and 
their advisers seem to me to place an undue amount of confidence into the mere 
mechanics of expenditures and particularly in the efficacy of governmental 
33 Clemence (1951) pp. 123/124. Or Reconstruction, pp. 175/176. This was written in 1934, 
decades before the development of chaos theory. 
34 I quote from the typewritten manuscript found in the Schumpeter papers in the Harvard 
University Archive, dated Cambridge, Mass, May 1945. Schumpeter's comments actually refer 
to the Full Employment Bill before it became law. The printed version is not available to me. 
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deficit expenditure. But all that really matters is that the bill, if passed, would 
create machinery for coordinating and rationalizing the unwieldy mass of 
private and public decisions that produce subsequent business situations, and 
for prompt preventive and remedial action. 
The issue becomes here that government expenditures should take a form that 
can be quickly stopped, or even better, that stop automatically when no longer 
needed. Of course, government has to provide roads and schools, and no doubt 
to some extent these public works can be used for counter-cyclical policy. 3~ But 
the use for this purpose is and should be limited: you need schools when there are 
children to be educated, not when a depression hits. On the other hand, unem- 
ployment relief meets this criterion. Schumpeter advocated that any measure of 
deficit financing should also provide for its cessation as soon as the need for it has 
disappeared. And so would, to some extent, Milton Friedman's negative income 
tax. 
"Environmental factors" 
I now come to the environmental factors to which Schumpeter refers. The first of 
these, the need for savings, has already been discussed. The decisive difference 
between the Keynes of the General Theory and Schumpeter is that Keynes be- 
lieved that technological progress itself was subject to diminishing returns, some- 
thing Schumpeter considered illogical, if not absurd. But the consequence of this 
view is not merely a pessimism about the necessary investments forthcoming, but 
a policy which is actively hostile to savings. The real problem with deficit financ- 
ing is that it all too easily creates a policy in which consumption interests swamp 
the needs of investments 36, and, as chaos theory suggests, situations which can 
be reversed only with great difficulty if at all. 
The second point is to discuss social policy in the context of development. 
Here too, the problem is of a more-or-less rather than an either-or nature. There 
is no doubt that social policy may be the danger for development, a point stressed 
by the political right and also stressed by Schumpeter already in 1918. But there 
are two aspects which make social policy in my opinion a logical complement of 
development. 
To start off, development means change, and change means that someone gets 
hurt. It is necessary to stress that present virtue will be rewarded later. But it is 
not sufficient to argue that on the average everybody will be better off. It is the 
35 To some extent the market will see to that. Very low interest rates during a depression make 
borrowing by municipalities and other government authorities for public works easier as well as 
more attractive. 
36 Schumpeter thought that, although Keynes did not create the hostility to savings in the 
United States, the fact that it already existed there accounted for much of  his success: it seemed 
to give a rationale for what people wanted to do anyway. But Schumpeter was also very pleased 
with Keynes' plan on how to finance the war which stressed savings. In the public discussion of 
"supply siders" one finds continuously that any reduction of consumption would reduce invest- 
ment incentives - which is the same old hostility to savings noted by Schumpeter. On the other 
hand, the socalled "liberal" economists who are all supposed to be big spenders and "Keyne- 
sians" stress the need for increased savings at the present time so as to reduce the real rates of 
interest and stimulate investments - which is precisely Schumpeter's point. Things evidently are 
not always what they seem. 
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individual who counts. People age, the workers displaced by technical change 
may not find alternative jobs without great loss of wages etc. Social policy is a 
requirement of social justice, of today's social environment. 
But there is no sense in trying to preserve specific jobs, and indeed there is 
great danger in that because it is a policy not to facilitate adaptations but to 
prevent change, a policy that necessarily must fail, but which in the process of 
failure involves high and unnecessary cost. 
On the other hand, there is a great deal of economic sense in trying to maintain 
incomes. Any successful innovation eventually leads to an increase in available 
goods and a deflationary pressure as new goods come on the market, and loans 
are repaid and old producers are driven out of business. Such a downward 
movement is a part of the cycle which, to some extent, must occur, but which must 
not be allowed to get out of hand: In Schumpeterian terminology, a recession is 
needed, a depression is logically unnecessary. Social policy becomes also a meth- 
od of preventing an unnecessary deflation. In this context only a few hints must 
suffice on Schumpeter's view of the function of money in an evolutionary capital- 
ist economy. 
In a stationary equilibrium economy, money provides simply the num6raire 
which allows relative prices to be translated into money prices. As Schumpeter 
noticed (with some pride at this discovery, it might be added) there must be one 
good which is not demanded for its own sake. The institution of money is a logical 
part of an equilibrium system, and not dependent on such reasoning as that it 
makes transactions more convenient. And that, i.e., the determination of money 
prices, is all that the quantity theory of money can satisfactorily explain. 
In an evolutionary capitalist economy, the factors of production needed to 
introduce innovations must be bought, typically, "though not of logical neces- 
sity", with newly created credit. (I consider here only Schumpeter's first approx- 
imation.) In non-capitalist societies, the same shift of factors or production into 
innovatory channels is achieved through a command, be it that of central socialist 
planners or of a feudal lord. 
There is every sense to mitigate the inevitable deflationary process through a 
social policy which adapts consumption levels to the new productive capacity and 
to prevent the quantity of money from falling so as to plunge the economy into 
a depression which, in Schumpeter's analysis, has no economic function. Social 
policy which maintains incomes fulfils also this function without hurting the 
necessary future savings activities, aT 
Thus I come to the conclusion that social policy becomes necessary precisely 
in an evolutionary economy in which its major function is to maintain incomes, 
but not specific jobs. 
37 There is here a certain parallelism to monetarist  prescriptions of maintaining ,the growth of 
the amount  of money - the exact definition is not at issue here. Schumpeter also agrees with the 
monetarists that  one cannot  really trust Government  to do even otherwise desirable things right. 
But there are also important  differences. In principle, all policy prescriptions of Schumpeter rest 
on a real basis and allow a rather more active role for policy. But in this connection it is only 
fair to add that  Milton Friedman is not only the dean of monetarists but  also the father of the 
negative income tax whose purpose is precisely to maintain incomes. But as I quoted Schumpeter 
before, one may well agree with policies without agreeing on the theoretical basis underlying the 
prescriptions. And one may also accept some analyses while putting them into a different context 
or interpreting them differently. Yet sooner or later will come the point where different theories 
imply different actions. 
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Concluding remarks 
In many respects the prescriptions of evolutionary and other economic policies 
agree. This should not be surprising. It nevertheless seems to me important to 
stress the central role of economic policy in an evolutionary environment. Evolu- 
tion demands economic policy. Equilibrium can do without it. Evolution de- 
mands constant watchfulness and reaction and, if possible, anticipation of what 
happens in the economy. Equilibrium can be satisfied with general rules - and 
what is true for equilibrium is also true for "steady states" or "proportional 
development". 
Evolutionary economic policy also must always ask the question of how a 
particular situation has come about. The discussion of the American budgetary 
problems or the reform problems in, say, the former GDR are beautiful examples. 
In the US the current budgetary discussion suffers from the fact that it is politically 
apparently unacceptable to stress that the present difficulties have been created by 
policies which go back at least a decade, and that there can be no quick fix. In fact, 
as the result of the de facto anti-savings policy of the past few years, a situation 
has been created in which there is no "right" policy to avoid a recession, only a 
least bad one. 
A similar lack of historic perspective is visible in the former GDR and the 
other communist countries whose economies have collapsed - as experts like 
Abram Bergson have foreseen for some time. There are two aspects involved: the 
first is that generally time lags are underestimated which must elapse until a (good 
or bad) policy becomes effective. So if someone warns that a particular policy will 
lead to trouble, there is disbelief and lack of still possible counteraction if this 
trouble does not appear immediately. 
The second is that one cannot simply undo the past. History moves only in one 
direction. It is impossible to achieve a state of affairs which, with a different 
starting point, would have been reached. There is much loose talk particularly in 
the former communist East about the "social achievements" of the system which 
now must be sacrificed on the altar of the market system, and about attempts to 
find a middle way. 
What is overlooked is that the collapse came about precisely because past 
policies were unsustainable without adequate increases in productivity and that 
the losses of social security are not the consequence of a shift to a new market 
system but of past policies. Talk about preserving a middle way are mostly nothing 
but wishes to make history stand still, to avoid the necessary changes which will 
make the future better. This phenomenon is, of course, familiar to anyone who ever 
has worked in an LDC. And an American has to be somewhat charitable in judging 
other countries, since in his country the same phenomenon can be seen in the 
insistence that the past good years were the achievment of the President while the 
enormous deficits (and in the private sector, the Savings and Loan debacle or the 
junk bond excesses) which were among the root causes of that very prosperity are 
blamed upon Congress. Only a totally un-evolutionary view can have it both ways. 
There is a final point. The results of an equilibrium economy are peace and 
quiet - and poverty and a firm social structure. Yet, if reality is "turbulent", this 
peace and quiet cannot last: it is impossible to lock in a desirable structure without 
constant change. 
The result of an evolutionary economy is change, social unrest, increased 
welfare of all, particularly of the poor, but at great temporary cost. It is not 
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surprising that  every-one wants  the results o f  evolut ion wi thout  being willing to 
pay the price. It  is no t  surprising that  the wish for simple u top ian  solutions never 
ceases. It  is a funct ion o f  economic  policy in a s ta t ionary e c o n o m y  to leave 
everything alone. It  is the funct ion o f  economic  (including social) policy in an 
evolut ionary  econom y  to facilitate changes but  to mitigate their cost. This is its 
ul t imate cont r ibut ion  to the stability o f  the social system which allows economic  
development .  
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